Make sure you understand this was a long lasting complex affair that is difficult to understand. Riehn does much to explain this campaign. More than just about any war that comes to mind this was a battle of logistics. Starvation and disease killed more certainly than any bullet during the campaign. Riehn goes to explain at great depth why Napoleon's preparations failed so miserably. There are other aspects that other historians gloss over. One of these was how the Grand Army's experience worked perfectly against it. How the lack of discipline in gathering what supplies were available ensured that most the army never touched what was gathered. Further Riehn explains how the French Army's supply organization was a perhaps the Army's worst enemy. He goes on to highlight how forced marches just ensured huge losses when the supply wagons could not keep up. Marshal Davout's forced marches cost the French 30,000 troops in a week. This was just short of what the Grand Army would suffer at Borodino.